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Unleashing Market Forces in Legal Education and the Legal Profession

18 Pages Posted: 18 Dec 2012  

Deborah Jones Merritt

Ohio State University (OSU) - Michael E. Moritz College of Law

Daniel C. Merritt

Independent

Date Written: December 17, 2012

Abstract

Brian Tamanaha has written a thoughtful critique of legal education; we agree with his assessment and many of his prescriptions. Tamanaha, however, does not press hard enough on a fundamental flaw that plagues both legal education and law practice: Our profession operates as a tournament guild. Law schools and established practitioners maintain a lengthy, stressful, and expensive series of competitions to separate winners from losers. A small number of lawyers reap most of the guild profits; others toil for much less reward or leave the profession.

Addressing this problem requires easing the market restraints that currently shield the legal profession. Ordinary fraud and consumer protection laws adequately protect clients; tighter constraints benefit established lawyers, while harming new lawyers and consumers. In this essay, we outline law’s status as a tournament guild, then suggest how market competition could address some of the problems identified by Tamanaha and other critics of legal education.

Keywords: markets, legal education, Tamanaha, law schools, ABA, legal ethics, model rules of professional conduct

JEL Classification: K2, K21

Suggested Citation

Merritt, Deborah Jones and Merritt, Daniel C., Unleashing Market Forces in Legal Education and the Legal Profession (December 17, 2012). Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, Forthcoming; Ohio State Public Law Working Paper No. 180. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2190398 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2190398

Deborah Jones Merritt (Contact Author)

Ohio State University (OSU) - Michael E. Moritz College of Law ( email )

55 West 12th Avenue
Columbus, OH 43210
United States
614-247-7933 (Phone)
614-292-4868 (Fax)

Daniel C. Merritt

Independent ( email )

No Address Available

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