Patent Litigation Settlement in Germany - Why Parties Settle During Trial

36 Pages Posted: 22 Dec 2012

See all articles by Katrin Cremers

Katrin Cremers

Center for European Economic Research (ZEW)

Paula Schliessler

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Date Written: 2012

Abstract

This paper looks at the decision to settle patent litigation in Germany from a new angle by focusing on detailed data on within-trial actions and motivations by plaintiff, defendant and the courts. Using a new dataset covering about 80% of all patent litigation cases in Germany between 2000 and 2008 we estimate the likelihood of within-trial settlement. We find that the within-trial settlement decision is to some degree driven by the proceedings that change the pre-trial setting of the negotiations in terms of information and stakes and make previously refused settlement a new option. Additionally, firm-specific stakes as measured by the relation of the involved parties to the disputed patent as well as firm-specific strategies are found to affect the general willingness to settle after the filing of a court case. The results suggest that pre-trial failure of settlement negotiations can to some extent be offset by within-trial settlement through efforts made by court and involved parties, but that the disposition to settle is to a larger degree determined by firm-specific stakes and strategies in the case.

Keywords: Patent, Patent Litigation, Settlement

JEL Classification: O34, K41

Suggested Citation

Cremers, Katrin and Schliessler, Paula, Patent Litigation Settlement in Germany - Why Parties Settle During Trial (2012). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 12-084, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2192055 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2192055

Katrin Cremers (Contact Author)

Center for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1 D-68161 Mannheim
Germany

Paula Schliessler

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

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