Deregulation, Misallocation, and Size: Evidence from India

51 Pages Posted: 22 Dec 2012 Last revised: 16 Oct 2014

See all articles by Laura Alfaro

Laura Alfaro

Harvard University

Anusha Chari

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Kenan-Flagler Business School

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Date Written: December 2012

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of the deregulation of compulsory industrial licensing in India on firm-size dynamics and the reallocation of resources within industries over time. Following deregulation, we find that the extent of resource misallocation declines and a considerable thickening of the left-hand tail of the firm-size distribution suggesting a significant increase in the number of small firms. However, the dominance and growth of large incumbents remains unchallenged. Quantile regressions reveal that the distributional effects of deregulation on firm size are significantly non-linear. The size distribution we observe--namely, a large number of small firms and a small number of large firms--can be characterized as the "missing middle" in Indian manufacturing and suggests that small firms may continue to face constraints in their attempts to grow.

Suggested Citation

Alfaro, Laura and Chari, Anusha, Deregulation, Misallocation, and Size: Evidence from India (December 2012). NBER Working Paper No. w18650. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2192823

Laura Alfaro (Contact Author)

Harvard University ( email )

Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Anusha Chari

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Department of Economics ( email )

Chapel Hill, NC 27599
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Kenan-Flagler Business School

McColl Building
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3490
United States

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