Anticompetitive Exclusion in Related Markets

33 Pages Posted: 25 Dec 2012 Last revised: 30 Jan 2013

Paolo Ramezzana

Federal Trade Commission

Date Written: December 1, 2012

Abstract

This paper shows how monopolization of a given market through exclusive contracts can affect the profitability of monopolization of another market in a model with two incumbent firms, each producing a distinct substitute or complementary good and each facing a distinct potential entrant. Externalities between incumbents operate through a "scale effect" and a "profit extraction effect." With linear demand, when both potential entrants have intermediate levels of entry costs there exist multiple equilibria. In particular, when the goods are strong complements there exists an equilibrium with monopolization in both markets and an equilibrium with entry in both markets. When the goods are substitutes or weak complements there exist two asymmetric equilibria, each with a different incumbent monopolizing its market while the other does not. The equilibrium is instead unique when at least one of the two potential entrants has very high or very low entry costs. I discuss implications for antitrust enforcement in markets for complementary inputs and for national antitrust policy-making in the presence of international trade in substitute goods.

Keywords: Monopolization, Exclusive dealing, Strategic complementarities, Antitrust policy, International trade

JEL Classification: L12, L41, L42

Suggested Citation

Ramezzana, Paolo, Anticompetitive Exclusion in Related Markets (December 1, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2193618 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2193618

Paolo Ramezzana (Contact Author)

Federal Trade Commission ( email )

601 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20580
United States

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