To 'B' or Not to 'B': A Welfare Analysis of Breaking Up Monopolies in an Endogenous Growth Model

HKUST 2000

22 Pages Posted: 22 May 2000

See all articles by Danyang Xie

Danyang Xie

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 21, 2000

Abstract

We study the welfare consequences of a government regulation that forces a patented equipment to be supplied by n independent producers. On the one hand, such a regulation hurts the value of a patent and therefore reduces activities in the R&D sector. On the other hand, the enhanced competition for the equipment improves efficiency in the manufacturing sector. Should we break up monopolies protected by intellectual property rights? The answer is no in a Romer-type growth model but we have sufficient reason to believe that the answer could be yes in a model advocated by Jones (1995).

Keywords: R&D, Growth, Competition Policy

JEL Classification: O31, O38, O41

Suggested Citation

Xie, Danyang, To 'B' or Not to 'B': A Welfare Analysis of Breaking Up Monopolies in an Endogenous Growth Model (March 21, 2000). HKUST 2000. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=219468 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.219468

Danyang Xie (Contact Author)

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) - Department of Economics ( email )

Clear Water Bay
Kowloon, Hong Kong
China
852-2358-7603 (Phone)
852-2358-2084 (Fax)

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
99
Abstract Views
793
rank
229,154
PlumX Metrics