How Frequent Financial Reporting Can Cause Managerial Short-Termism: An Analysis of the Costs and Benefits of Increasing Reporting Frequency
43 Pages Posted: 3 Jan 2013 Last revised: 23 Jan 2014
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How Frequent Financial Reporting Can Cause Managerial Short-Termism: An Analysis of the Costs and Benefits of Increasing Reporting Frequency
How Frequent Financial Reporting Can Cause Managerial Short-Termism: An Analysis of the Costs and Benefits of Increasing Reporting Frequency
Date Written: December 1, 2012
Abstract
We develop a cost-benefit tradeoff that provides new insights into the frequency with which firms should be required to report the results of their operations to the capital market. The benefit to increasing the frequency of financial reporting is that it causes market prices to better deter investments in negative net present value projects. The cost of increased frequency is that it increases the probability of inducing managerial short-termism. We analyze the tradeoff between these costs and benefits and develop conditions under which greater reporting frequency is desirable and conditions under which it is not.
Keywords: Transparency, Mandatory Financial Reporting, Frequency of Financial Reporting, Real Effects of Disclosure, Managerial Myopia
JEL Classification: D80, G30, M41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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