Civil Liability of Rating Agencies - Regulatory All-or-Nothing Approaches between Immunity and Over-Deterrence

20 Pages Posted: 6 Jan 2013

See all articles by Brigitte Haar

Brigitte Haar

Goethe University Frankfurt - Research Center SAFE; Columbia University - Law School

Date Written: January 2, 2013

Abstract

Civil liability of rating agencies has to strike a balance between over-deterrence and overly lax behavior control. The resulting problems of a capital market freeze and difficulties of proof, as they become apparent in most legal systems and the European Commission’s Draft Proposal to amend the EU-Rating Regulation, could possibly be eliminated by procedural presumptions or liability caps.

Keywords: rating agencies, liability, European Commission’s Draft Proposal to amend the EU-Rating Regulation, CRA3, Dodd Frank Act

JEL Classification: F02, F36, G18, G28, G38, K12, K13, K22, K23, K33, K42, L51

Suggested Citation

Haar, Brigitte, Civil Liability of Rating Agencies - Regulatory All-or-Nothing Approaches between Immunity and Over-Deterrence (January 2, 2013). University of Oslo Faculty of Law Research Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2196828 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2196828

Brigitte Haar (Contact Author)

Goethe University Frankfurt - Research Center SAFE ( email )

(http://www.safe-frankfurt.de)
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany
49-69-79833764 (Phone)
49-69-79833904 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de/haar/

Columbia University - Law School ( email )

435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/Brigitte_Haar

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