War as an Investment

45 Pages Posted: 8 Jan 2013

See all articles by Thomas Chadefaux

Thomas Chadefaux

Trinity College Dublin, Department of Political Science

Date Written: September 1, 2012

Abstract

States often bargain over objects that affect their future bargaining power. A large territory, for example, is not only valuable in itself, but also as a source of raw material, population and defense. As a result, states not only try to maximize their benefits when they negotiate over the partition of a territory; they also strive to increase their power --- their ability to secure a favorable outcome in the future. We study these situations in the context of two- and three-player bargaining games in which present outcomes affect future power, and show three main results: (i) in a two-player negotiation, war never occurs in equilibrium, unless states value the future too differently; (ii) with three players, war can occur in equilibrium; (iii) however, these wars of investments --- wars aimed at accumulating resources that improve their ability to secure favorable outcomes in future negotiations --- only occur if there are increasing returns in the mapping from resources to the probability of winning.

Keywords: war, conflict, bargaining, rationality, negotiation, third party

JEL Classification: D74, H5, N40, C72, C78

Suggested Citation

Chadefaux, Thomas, War as an Investment (September 1, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2197330 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2197330

Thomas Chadefaux (Contact Author)

Trinity College Dublin, Department of Political Science ( email )

College Green 2-3
Dublin 2
Ireland

HOME PAGE: http://www.thomaschadefaux.com

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
58
Abstract Views
747
rank
398,880
PlumX Metrics