The Budgetary Procedure in the European Union and the Implications of the Treaty of Lisbon

KU Leuven, Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy and Innovation (MSI), OR 1227

32 Pages Posted: 12 Jan 2013

See all articles by Christophe Crombez

Christophe Crombez

Stanford University - Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies; KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB)

Bjorn Hoyland

University of Oslo - Department of Political Science

Date Written: 2012

Abstract

The Treaty of Lisbon reformed the budgetary procedure of the European Union (EU). This paper describes the key changes and presents a game-theoretical analysis of the annual budgetary procedure. Our focus is on the implications of these changes for the budgetary powers of the European Parliament (EP). Against the common belief that the budgetary powers of the EP were strengthened as a result of the Lisbon Treaty, our analysis paints a somewhat more sober assessment of its budgetary empowerment as a result of the reform. We find that the budgetary procedure operates much like the codecision procedure does in the legislative process. Compared to the budgetary procedure used prior to the Lisbon Treaty, it has become more difficult for the Parliament to pass amendments, if it wants to affect what used to be referred to as non-compulsory spending or decrease compulsory spending. The EP’s ability to pass amendments that increase compulsory spending is mostly unaffected. The configuration of preferences and bargaining powers in the Conciliation Committee determine whether on balance the EP is better off under the new procedure.

Suggested Citation

Crombez, Christophe and Hoyland, Bjorn, The Budgetary Procedure in the European Union and the Implications of the Treaty of Lisbon (2012). KU Leuven, Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy and Innovation (MSI), OR 1227. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2198912 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2198912

Christophe Crombez (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB) ( email )

Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

Bjorn Hoyland

University of Oslo - Department of Political Science ( email )

PO Box 6706 St Olavs plass
Oslo, N-0317
Norway

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