Fish or Fence? Sovereign-to-Sovereign Relations in High Sea Fisheries

35 Pages Posted: 12 Jan 2013

See all articles by Terry L. Anderson

Terry L. Anderson

PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

Bryan Leonard

Arizona State University (ASU)

Date Written: December 28, 2012

Abstract

This paper builds on the framework developed by Anderson and McChesney (1994) to analyze two sovereigns bargaining over the use of scarce resources. We adapt the "raid or trade" model of disputes over land to the high seas fisheries context, where sovereigns must decide whether to continue the race to fish or restrict access to the fishery, i.e. fi sh or fence. After discussing the unique challenges presented by attempting to manage an open access resource that crosses national boundaries, we construct a basic model of the costs and benefi ts of resource depletion versus joint management. Sovereigns will deplete marine resources if the costs of negotiation outweigh the expected benefi ts of management. Di fferences in institutions, collective action problems, heterogeneity amongst fishermen, and lack of scientifi c data make the benefi ts of management less certain and increase the likelihood of depletion. We close by applying our analytical framework in the context of several case studies.

Suggested Citation

Anderson, Terry L. and Leonard, Bryan, Fish or Fence? Sovereign-to-Sovereign Relations in High Sea Fisheries (December 28, 2012). PERC Research Paper No. 13-1, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2199648

Terry L. Anderson (Contact Author)

PERC - Property and Environment Research Center ( email )

2048 Analysis Drive
Suite A
Bozeman, MT 59718
United States

Bryan Leonard

Arizona State University (ASU) ( email )

Tempe, AZ 85287
United States

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