Voters Prefer More Qualified Mayors, But Does It Matter for Public Finances? Evidence for Germany

41 Pages Posted: 15 Jan 2013

See all articles by Ronny Freier

Ronny Freier

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)

Sebastian Thomasius

Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Department of Business and Economics; Government of the Federal Republic of Germany - German Federal Ministry of Finance

Date Written: December 1, 2012

Abstract

This paper studies the importance of politician's qualification, in terms of education and experience, for fiscal outcomes. The analysis is based on a large panel for 2,031 German municipalities for which we have collected information on municipal budgets as well as the election results and qualification levels of mayoral candidates. We principally use a Regression Discontinuity Design focusing on close elections to estimate causal effects. We find that mayors with prior experience in office indeed tend to reduce the level of local public debt, lower total municipal expenditures and decrease the local taxes. In contrast, the education level of the mayor exerts no significant effects on the overall fiscal performance of the municipality. The results are partly surprising as both education and experience are shown to matter greatly in the electoral success of mayoral candidates.

Keywords: mayoral elections, regression discontinuity design, politician's education and experience, fiscal outcomes

JEL Classification: D72, H11, H72

Suggested Citation

Freier, Ronny and Thomasius, Sebastian and Thomasius, Sebastian, Voters Prefer More Qualified Mayors, But Does It Matter for Public Finances? Evidence for Germany (December 1, 2012). DIW Berlin Discussion Paper No. 1262, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2200957 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2200957

Ronny Freier (Contact Author)

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) ( email )

Mohrenstraße 58
Berlin, 10117
Germany

Sebastian Thomasius

Government of the Federal Republic of Germany - German Federal Ministry of Finance ( email )

Wilhelmstrasse 97
Berlin, 10117
Germany

Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Department of Business and Economics ( email )

Boltzmannstrasse 20
LS Corneo
Berlin, 14195
Germany

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
103
Abstract Views
810
Rank
569,970
PlumX Metrics