Games and Economic Behavior 98 (2016): 68–77
22 Pages Posted: 18 Jan 2013 Last revised: 4 Jul 2019
Date Written: June 6, 2016
We propose a way to compare the extent of preference misrepresentation between two strategies. We define a preference revelation mechanism to be monotone strategyproof if declaring a “more truthful” preference ordering dominates (with respect to the true preferences) declaring a “less truthful” preference ordering. Our main result states that a mechanism is strategyproof if, and only if, it is monotone strategyproof. This result holds for any deterministic social choice function on any domain; for probabilistic social choice functions it holds under a mild assumption on the domain.
Keywords: Strategyproofness, Kemeny sets, misrepresentations, dominant strategy
JEL Classification: C72, D41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation