Monotone Strategyproofness

Games and Economic Behavior 98 (2016): 68–77

22 Pages Posted: 18 Jan 2013 Last revised: 4 Jul 2019

See all articles by Guillaume Haeringer

Guillaume Haeringer

City University of New York, Baruch College - Zicklin School of Business - Department of Economics and Finance

Hanna Halaburda

Bank of Canada; New York University (NYU); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: June 6, 2016

Abstract

We propose a way to compare the extent of preference misrepresentation between two strategies. We define a preference revelation mechanism to be monotone strategyproof if declaring a “more truthful” preference ordering dominates (with respect to the true preferences) declaring a “less truthful” preference ordering. Our main result states that a mechanism is strategyproof if, and only if, it is monotone strategyproof. This result holds for any deterministic social choice function on any domain; for probabilistic social choice functions it holds under a mild assumption on the domain.

Keywords: Strategyproofness, Kemeny sets, misrepresentations, dominant strategy

JEL Classification: C72, D41

Suggested Citation

Haeringer, Guillaume and Halaburda, Hanna, Monotone Strategyproofness (June 6, 2016). Games and Economic Behavior 98 (2016): 68–77. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2202176 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2202176

Guillaume Haeringer

City University of New York, Baruch College - Zicklin School of Business - Department of Economics and Finance

17 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10010
United States

Hanna Halaburda (Contact Author)

Bank of Canada ( email )

234 Wellington Street
Ontario, Ottawa K1A 0G9
Canada

New York University (NYU) ( email )

Bobst Library, E-resource Acquisitions
20 Cooper Square 3rd Floor
New York, NY 10003-711
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Munich
Germany

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
45
Abstract Views
399
PlumX Metrics