The Changing of the Guards: Can Physicians Contain Social Insurance Costs?

24 Pages Posted: 19 Jan 2013

See all articles by Simen Markussen

Simen Markussen

University of Oslo - Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research

Knut Roed

Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Ole Jorgen Røgeberg

Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research

Abstract

Based on administrative data from Norway, we examine the extent to which family doctors influence their clients' propensity to claim sick pay and disability benefits. The analysis is based on exogenous shifts of family doctors occurring when physicians quit, retire, or for other reasons sell their patient lists to other doctors. Our key finding is that family doctors have significant influence on their clients' benefit claims. We conclude that it is possible for family doctors to contain social insurance costs to some extent, and that there is a significant variation across doctors in the way they do so.

Keywords: sick pay, disability insurance, absence certification, gatekeepers

JEL Classification: H55, I13

Suggested Citation

Markussen, Simen and Røed, Knut and Røgeberg, Ole Jorgen, The Changing of the Guards: Can Physicians Contain Social Insurance Costs?. IZA Discussion Paper No. 7122, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2203272

Simen Markussen (Contact Author)

University of Oslo - Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research ( email )

Gaustadalleen 21
N-0317 Oslo
Norway

Knut Røed

Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research ( email )

Gaustadalleen 21
N-0349 Oslo
Norway

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Ole Jorgen Røgeberg

Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research ( email )

Gaustadalleen 21
N-0349 Oslo
Norway
+ 47 22 95 88 27 (Phone)
+ 47 22 95 88 25 (Fax)

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