Seller-Paid Ratings

52 Pages Posted: 23 Jan 2013 Last revised: 15 Jun 2018

See all articles by Sergey Kovbasyuk

Sergey Kovbasyuk

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)

Date Written: May 29, 2018

Abstract

A rater is paid by a seller, observes a signal about the seller's product, and issues a public cheap-talk rating for potential buyers. I characterize the partition of the rater's information into ratings issued following public payments from the seller to the rater, and ratings issued when the seller pays the rater in private. Public payments support precise ratings in equilibrium. Private payments tend to be inflated for high ratings, which endogenously leads to coarse ratings in equilibrium. A competitive rater issues uninformative ratings when payments are private. Under public payments, a competitive rater issues a coarse rating for signals below a threshold and precise ratings for signals above the threshold.

Keywords: cheap talk, rating agency, mechanism design, transparency, disclosure, limited commitment, certification

JEL Classification: G24, G28, D82, L15

Suggested Citation

Kovbasyuk, Sergey, Seller-Paid Ratings (May 29, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2204641 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2204641

Sergey Kovbasyuk (Contact Author)

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) ( email )

via Sallustiana 62
Rome, Roma 00187
Italy
393484523151 (Phone)
3484523151 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.eief.it/faculty-visitors/faculty-a-z/sergei-kovbasyuk/

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
187
rank
152,435
Abstract Views
959
PlumX Metrics