Margins and Market Shares: Pharmacy Incentives for Generic Substitution

36 Pages Posted: 23 Jan 2013

See all articles by Kurt Richard Brekke

Kurt Richard Brekke

NHH Norwegian School of Economics - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Tor Helge Holmas

University of Bergen - Department of Economics

Odd Rune Straume

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); University of Minho - Economic Policies Research Unit (NIPE)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 18, 2012

Abstract

We study the impact of product margins on pharmacies’ incentive to promote generics instead of brand-names. First, we construct a theoretical model where pharmacies can persuade patients with a brand-name prescription to purchase a generic version instead. We show that pharmacies’ substitution incentives are determined by relative margins and relative patient copayments. Second, we exploit a unique product level panel data set, which contains information on sales and prices at both producer and retail level. In the empirical analysis, we find a strong relationship between the margins of brand-names and generics and their market shares. This relationship is stronger for pharmaceuticals under reference pricing rather than coinsurance. In terms of policy implications, our results suggest that pharmacy incentives are crucial for promoting generic sales.

Keywords: pharmaceuticals, pharmacies, generic substitution

JEL Classification: I11, I18, L13, L65

Suggested Citation

Brekke, Kurt Richard and Holmas, Tor Helge and Straume, Odd Rune and Straume, Odd Rune, Margins and Market Shares: Pharmacy Incentives for Generic Substitution (December 18, 2012). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4055, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2204950 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2204950

Kurt Richard Brekke (Contact Author)

NHH Norwegian School of Economics - Department of Economics ( email )

Helleveien 30
N-5035 Bergen
Norway

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Tor Helge Holmas

University of Bergen - Department of Economics ( email )

Fosswinckelsgt. 6
N-5007 Bergen, 5007
Norway
+47 55589238 (Phone)
+47 55589210 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.uib.no/stab/torHelge.html

Odd Rune Straume

University of Minho - Economic Policies Research Unit (NIPE) ( email )

Campus de Gualtar
Braga, 4710-057
Portugal

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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