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Aligning Learning Incentives of Students and Teachers: Results from a Social Experiment
In Mexican High Schools

51 Pages Posted: 26 Jan 2013  

Jere Behrman

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Susan Parker

Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) - Division of Economics

Petra Todd

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Kenneth I. Wolpin

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Date Written: October 1, 2012

Abstract

This paper evaluates the impact of three different performance incentives schemes using data from a social experiment that randomized 88 Mexican high schools with over 40,000 students into three treatment groups and a control group. Treatment one provides individual incentives for performance on curriculum-based mathematics tests to students only, treatment two to teachers only and treatment three gives both individual and group incentives to students, teachers and school administrators. Program impact estimates reveal the largest average effects for treatment three, smaller impacts for treatment one and no impact for treatment two.

Keywords: student, teacher, and group incentives, randomized social experiment, Mexican high schools

JEL Classification: I2, O1

Suggested Citation

Behrman, Jere and Parker, Susan and Todd, Petra and Wolpin, Kenneth I., Aligning Learning Incentives of Students and Teachers: Results from a Social Experiment In Mexican High Schools (October 1, 2012). PIER Working Paper No. 13-004. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2206883 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2206883

Jere R. Behrman

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

160 McNeil Building
3718 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-7704 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

Susan Parker

Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) - Division of Economics ( email )

Carretera Mexico Toluca 3655
01210 Mexico, D.F.
Mexico

Petra Todd (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

160 McNeil Building
3718 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Kenneth I. Wolpin

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

160 McNeil Building
3718 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-7708 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

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