Proceedings of the International Conference on Social Computing, Behavioral-Cultural Modeling & Prediction, 2013
10 Pages Posted: 27 Jan 2013
Date Written: January 27, 2013
Quantal response equilibrium (QRE) has become a popular alternative to the standard Nash equilibrium concept in game theoretic applications. It is well known that human subjects do not regularly choose Nash equilibrium strategies. It has been hypothesized that subjects are limited by strategic uncertainty or that subjects have broader social preferences over the outcome of games. These two factors, among others, make subjects boundedly-rational. QRE, in essence, adds a logistic error function to the strict, knife-edge predictions of Nash equilibria. What makes QRE appealing, however, also makes it very difficult to test, because almost any observed behavior may be consistent with different parameterizations of the error function. We present the first steps of a research program designed to strip away the underlying causes of the strategic errors thought to be modeled by QRE. If these causes of strategic error are correct explanations for the deviations, then their removal should enable subjects to choose Nash equilibrium strategies. We find, however, that subjects continue to deviate from predictions even when the reasons presumed by QRE are removed. Moreover, the deviations are different for each and every game, and thus QRE would require the same subjects to have different error parame-terizations. While we need more expansive testing of the various causes of stra-tegic error, in our judgment, therefore, QRE is not useful at predicting human behavior, and is of limited use in explaining human behavior across even a small range of similar decisions.
Keywords: bounded rationality, human behavior, Nash equilibrium, behavioral game theory, strategic uncertainty, social preferences, Quantal Response Equilibrium
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
McCubbins, Mathew D. and Turner, Mark B. and Weller, Nicholas, Testing the Foundations of Quantal Response Equilibrium (January 27, 2013). Proceedings of the International Conference on Social Computing, Behavioral-Cultural Modeling & Prediction, 2013. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2207636