Merger Control under China's Anti-Monopoly Law

36 Pages Posted: 27 Jan 2013 Last revised: 23 Sep 2015

D. Daniel Sokol

University of Florida - Levin College of Law; George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center

Date Written: January 27, 2013

Abstract

This paper explores the factors that drive merger outcomes under China's Anti-Monopoly Law (AML). The paper overcomes the problem of a small number of published merger decisions through a unique practitioner survey of antitrust lawyers across multiple jurisdictions. This survey captures transactions contemplated, but never undertaken (deterred by the merger regime), as well as mergers notified for approval under the AML. The survey allows for broader inferences to be drawn about the development of Chinese antitrust. These include: the welfare standard used in merger analysis, what industrial policy and other political factors may impact merger enforcement, as well as issues of institutional design, transparency, and delay.

Keywords: mergers, antitrust, competition law, AML, China, empirical, public choice, industrial policy, transparency, fairness

JEL Classification: P30, K21, L40, G34, F23

Suggested Citation

Sokol, D. Daniel, Merger Control under China's Anti-Monopoly Law (January 27, 2013). NYU Journal of Law and Business 10:1-36 (2013); Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-05. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2207690 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2207690

D. Daniel Sokol (Contact Author)

University of Florida - Levin College of Law ( email )

Spessard L. Holland Law Center
P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States
(352) 273-0968 (Phone)
(352) 392-3005 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.ufl.edu/faculty/d-daniel-sokol

George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center ( email )

200 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20052
United States

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