Merger Control under China's Anti-Monopoly Law
36 Pages Posted: 27 Jan 2013 Last revised: 30 Aug 2014
Date Written: January 27, 2013
Abstract
This paper explores the factors that drive merger outcomes under China's Anti-Monopoly Law (AML). The paper overcomes the problem of a small number of published merger decisions through a unique practitioner survey of antitrust lawyers across multiple jurisdictions. This survey captures transactions contemplated, but never undertaken (deterred by the merger regime), as well as mergers notified for approval under the AML. The survey allows for broader inferences to be drawn about the development of Chinese antitrust. These include: the welfare standard used in merger analysis, what industrial policy and other political factors may impact merger enforcement, as well as issues of institutional design, transparency, and delay.
Keywords: mergers, antitrust, competition law, AML, China, empirical, public choice, industrial policy, transparency, fairness
JEL Classification: P30, K21, L40, G34, F23
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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