Corporate Governance, Product-Related Voluntary Disclosure and Analysts’ Forecasts Properties

Posted: 3 Feb 2013 Last revised: 14 Jan 2016

See all articles by Luminita Enache

Luminita Enache

University of Calgary; Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business

Antonio Parbonetti

University of Padua

Date Written: January 21, 2013

Abstract

Using a sample of US biotech firms, this paper examines the joint impact of product-related voluntary disclosure and corporate governance on a firms’ information environment, specifically on analysts forecast accuracy, dispersion, precision of public and private information. Moreover, we investigate whether voluntary disclosure was consistently disclosed over time. Our findings, shows that the quality of corporate governance affects information transparency and play a role in reducing the uncertainty associated with future firms’ performance by increasing the precision of analysts’ common information and forecast accuracy, only when voluntary disclosure is constant over time. Analysts forecast dispersion decreases when more independent directors sit on the board. Voluntary disclosure and corporate governance quality are two mechanisms that act as complement to improve the quality of information available to financial analysts.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Board Composition, Product-Related Voluntary Disclosure, Earnings Forecasts Analysts

JEL Classification: M41, M4, O1

Suggested Citation

Enache, Luminita and Parbonetti, Antonio, Corporate Governance, Product-Related Voluntary Disclosure and Analysts’ Forecasts Properties (January 21, 2013). 2013 Financial Markets & Corporate Governance Conference. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2208924 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2204255

Luminita Enache (Contact Author)

University of Calgary ( email )

140 Scanlon Green NW
Calgary, Alberta T3L1N3
Canada
5874389015 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://haskayne.ucalgary.ca/haskayne_info/profiles/luminita-enache

Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business ( email )

140 Scanlon Green NW
Calgary, Alberta T3L1N3
Canada
5874389015 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://haskayne.ucalgary.ca/haskayne_info/profiles/luminita-enache

Antonio Parbonetti

University of Padua ( email )

Via del Santo 33
Padova, 35123
Italy
+39 049 8274261 (Phone)

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