CEO Incentive Compensation in U.S. Financial Institutions

36 Pages Posted: 1 Feb 2013 Last revised: 9 Jun 2014

See all articles by Gloria Yuan Tian

Gloria Yuan Tian

University of Lethbridge Calgary Campus; Financial Research Network (FIRN)

Fan Yang

University of Saskatchewan

Date Written: April 7, 2014

Abstract

This paper empirically addresses the questions of whether and, if yes, how U.S. bankers are compensated in particular with regard to incentive pay. Although the level of bank CEO pay has dropped during the financial crisis period, bank CEOs fared much better in comparison to their firms (and, in turn, their shareholders). Furthermore, bank CEO incentive pay beyond the justifiable portion is positively associated with CEO power measures. There is also some evidence, albeit weaker, that CEO power is positively related to CEO incentive pay switches.

Keywords: Executive compensation; financial institutions; CEO power; financial crisis

JEL Classification: G30

Suggested Citation

Tian, Gloria Yuan and Yang, Fan, CEO Incentive Compensation in U.S. Financial Institutions (April 7, 2014). International Review of Financial Analysis, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2209471 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2209471

Gloria Yuan Tian

University of Lethbridge Calgary Campus ( email )

6th floor, 345 - 6 Ave SE
Calgary, Alberta T2G 4V1
Canada

Financial Research Network (FIRN)

C/- University of Queensland Business School
St Lucia, 4071 Brisbane
Queensland
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://www.firn.org.au

Fan Yang (Contact Author)

University of Saskatchewan ( email )

College of Education
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan S7N 5A7
Canada

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