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Best-Reply Dynamic in Large Aggregative Games

31 Pages Posted: 2 Feb 2013  

Yakov Babichenko

Technion, Industrial Engineering and Managemenet

Date Written: January 28, 2013

Abstract

We consider small-influence aggregative games with a large number of players n. For this class of games we present a best-reply dynamic with the following two properties. First, the dynamic reaches Nash approximate equilibria fast (in at most cn log n steps for some constant c>0). Second, Nash approximate equilibria are played by the dynamic with a limit frequency of at least 1-e-c'n for some constant c'>0.

Keywords: Aggregative games, Best-reply dynamic, Cournot equilibrium, Fast convergence to equilibrium, Small influence games

JEL Classification: C73, D43

Suggested Citation

Babichenko, Yakov, Best-Reply Dynamic in Large Aggregative Games (January 28, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2210080 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2210080

Yakov Babichenko (Contact Author)

Technion, Industrial Engineering and Managemenet ( email )

Hiafa, 3434113
Israel

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