The Political Economy of Trade and Migration: Evidence from the U.S. Congress

39 Pages Posted: 1 Feb 2013 Last revised: 25 Jun 2018

See all articles by Paola Conconi

Paola Conconi

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES)

Giovanni Facchini

University of Nottingham

Max Friedrich Steinhardt

Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Department of Business and Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Centro Studi Luca D'Agliano (LdA); Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI)

Maurizio Zanardi

Lancaster University - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2012

Abstract

We systematically examine the drivers of U.S. congressmen's votes on trade and migration reforms since the 1970's. Standard trade theory suggests that reforms that lower barriers to goods and migrants should have similar distributional effects, hurting low-skilled U.S. workers while benefitting high-skilled workers. In line with this prediction, we find that House members representing more skilled-labor abundant districts are more likely to support both trade and migration liberalization. Still, important differences exist: Democrats favor trade reforms less than Republicans, while the opposite is true for immigration reforms; welfare state considerations and network effects shape support for immigration, but not for trade.

Keywords: immigration reforms, roll-call votes, trade reforms

JEL Classification: F1, F22

Suggested Citation

Conconi, Paola and Facchini, Giovanni and Steinhardt, Max Friedrich and Zanardi, Maurizio, The Political Economy of Trade and Migration: Evidence from the U.S. Congress (December 2012). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9270, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2210240

Paola Conconi (Contact Author)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) ( email )

Ave. Franklin D Roosevelt, 50 - C.P. 114
Brussels, B-1050
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32 2 650 4475 (Fax)

Giovanni Facchini

University of Nottingham ( email )

University Park
Nottingham, NG8 1BB
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Max Friedrich Steinhardt

Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Department of Business and Economics ( email )

Boltzmannstrasse 20
D-14195 Berlin, 14195
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Centro Studi Luca D'Agliano (LdA) ( email )

Via P. Amedeo 34
Milano, 20122
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/maxfriedrichsteinhardt/

Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI) ( email )

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Hamburg, 20148
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0049-40-340576-662 (Phone)
0049-(0)40-340576776 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/maxfriedrichsteinhardt/

Maurizio Zanardi

Lancaster University - Department of Economics ( email )

Lancaster LA1 4YX, LA1 4YX
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/staff/zanardi/

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