PRIVATE EQUITY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE DYNAMICS OF CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION, pp. 91-116, J. O’Brien, ed., Imperial College Press, London, 2007
26 Pages Posted: 6 Feb 2013
Date Written: June 6, 2007
This chapter is based on the proposition that managing conflicts of interest and other potentially problematic regulatory issues, are, and probably always have been, integral to how individuals, groups and societies manage their trading relationships with other individuals, groups and societies. In particular, the levels of regulatory relative autonomy that market actors possess, both now and in the past, can be extremely influential in deciding a jurisdiction’s regulatory agendas. How those agendas and their regulatory priorities evolve can be significant in shaping market practice and perceptions of what constitutes conflicts of interest and what should, or should not, be done in relation to them. This is true for all trading sectors, but the historical analysis of this chapter is on the financial services sector. The discussion is Anglo-centric in its focus, but will have some resonance regarding non-Anglo jurisdictions and how they regulate their financial markets.
Keywords: business regulation, conflicts of interest, trade
JEL Classification: G18, K42
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Gilligan, George, The Significance of Relative Autonomy in How Regulation of the Financial Services Sector Evolves (June 6, 2007). PRIVATE EQUITY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE DYNAMICS OF CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION, pp. 91-116, J. O’Brien, ed., Imperial College Press, London, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2212539