Strategic Manipulability of Self-­Selective Social Choice Rules

Gate Working Paper No. 1302

19 Pages Posted: 6 Feb 2013

See all articles by Mostapha Diss

Mostapha Diss

University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE)

Date Written: February 1, 2013

Abstract

We provide exact relations giving the probability of individual and coalitional manipulation of three specific social choice functions (Borda rule, Copeland rule, Plurality rule) in three-alternative elections when the notion of self-selectivity is imposed. The results suggest that the Borda rule is more vulnerable to coalitional manipulation than the Copeland rule and the Plurality rule. However, Plurality rule seems to be more vulnerable to individual manipulability when the number of voters is greater than a certain threshold value. In addition, the probability of individual and coalitional manipulation tends to vanish significantly when the notion of self-selectivity is imposed.

Keywords: voting rules, self-selectivity, stability, manipulability, probability

JEL Classification: D 72

Suggested Citation

Diss, Mostapha, Strategic Manipulability of Self-­Selective Social Choice Rules (February 1, 2013). Gate Working Paper No. 1302, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2212603 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2212603

Mostapha Diss (Contact Author)

University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE) ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France

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