State Strength and Economic Globalization: Proposing a Typology of CSR Regulation

39 Pages Posted: 7 Feb 2013  

Jette Steen Knudsen

Tufts University - The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Jeremy Moon

Nottingham University Business School (NUBS)

Date Written: February 7, 2013

Abstract

This article takes its starting point in two recent and related empirical developments: First, through Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) companies address global challenges and opportunities. Second, national governments increasingly regulate CSR. This poses a puzzle: if private actors face a range of new social demands as they operate in host countries then does that leave home country governments any room to regulate corporations? Existing research highlights three types of government involvement in CSR regulation: substitution, mirroring and private governance of transnational business. Each type can be categorized along two dimensions: the strength of economic globalization and the strength of the state. We show that explanations of the role of governments in driving CSR fail to account for the growth of government regulation that shapes internationalized CSR rules through companies. We propose that the literature on CSR regulation should include a fourth regulatory model characterized by a strong state and a high degree of economic globalization. We refer to this as “state-driven governance of transnational business”.

Keywords: corporate social responsibility (CSR), governance, domestic, transnational, typology

Suggested Citation

Knudsen, Jette Steen and Moon, Jeremy, State Strength and Economic Globalization: Proposing a Typology of CSR Regulation (February 7, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2212749 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2212749

Jette S. Knudsen (Contact Author)

Tufts University - The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy ( email )

Medford, MA 02155
United States

Jeremy Moon

Nottingham University Business School (NUBS) ( email )

Jubilee Campus
Wollaton Road
Nottingham, NG8 1BB
United Kingdom
+44 0 115 9514781 (Phone)

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