Strategically Seeking Service: How Competition Can Generate Poisson Arrivals

Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter 2004, pp. 23-40

18 Pages Posted: 8 Feb 2013

Date Written: 2004

Abstract

A delay-sensitive customer prefers arriving for service when few or no other customers are in the system. We consider how such a customer should strategically arrive to a service system. We present a model in which strategic customers acting in a self-interested fashion give rise to Poisson arrivals.

Keywords: Poisson process, service management, queuing, game theory, mixed-strategy equilibrium

Suggested Citation

Lariviere, Martin and Van Mieghem, Jan Albert, Strategically Seeking Service: How Competition Can Generate Poisson Arrivals (2004). Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter 2004, pp. 23-40, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2213291

Martin Lariviere

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

HOME PAGE: http://operationsroom.wordpress.com/

Jan Albert Van Mieghem (Contact Author)

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

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