Reputation in the Presence of Noisy Exogenous Learning

17 Pages Posted: 9 Feb 2013

See all articles by Ju Hu

Ju Hu

Peking University - National School of Development

Date Written: February 6, 2013

Abstract

This paper studies the reputation effect in which a long-lived player faces a sequence of uninformed short-lived players and the uninformed players receive informative but noisy exogenous signals about the type of the long-lived player. We provide an explicit lower bound on all Nash equilibrium payoffs of the long-lived player. The lower bound shows when the exogenous signals are sufficiently noisy and the long-lived player is patient, he can be assured of a payoff strictly higher than his minmax payoff.

Keywords: reputation, repeated games, learning, relative entropy

JEL Classification: C73, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Hu, Ju, Reputation in the Presence of Noisy Exogenous Learning (February 6, 2013). PIER Working Paper No. 13-009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2213830 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2213830

Ju Hu (Contact Author)

Peking University - National School of Development ( email )

Beijing, 100871
China

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
55
Abstract Views
816
rank
430,488
PlumX Metrics