Mediocracy, Fourth Version

36 Pages Posted: 9 Feb 2013  

Andrea Mattozzi

European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO)

Antonio Merlo

University of Pennsylvania - The Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science and Economics (PCPSE); Rice University

Date Written: February 8, 2013

Abstract

We study the recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by two political parties competing in an election. We show that political parties may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that they could select better individuals. Furthermore, we show that this phenomenon is more likely to occur in proportional than in majoritarian electoral systems.

Keywords: Politicians, Parties, Political Recruitment, Electoral Systems

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Mattozzi, Andrea and Merlo, Antonio M., Mediocracy, Fourth Version (February 8, 2013). PIER Working Paper No. 13-010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2213973 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2213973

Andrea Mattozzi

European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO) ( email )

Villa San Paolo
Via della Piazzuola 43
50133 Florence
Italy

Antonio M. Merlo (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - The Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science and Economics (PCPSE) ( email )

133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-7933 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/~merloa

Rice University ( email )

6100 South Main Street
Houston, TX 77005-1892
United States

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