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On the Wrong Side of the Law - Causes and Consequences of a Corrupt Judiciary

27 Pages Posted: 11 Feb 2013 Last revised: 3 Nov 2016

Stefan Voigt

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Jerg Gutmann

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law and Economics

Date Written: February 10, 2013

Abstract

Empirical research on the determinants of corruption has made substantial progress over the last decade. To date, the consequences of different structures of the legal enforcement institutions have, however, only played a marginal role. This contribution deals with both the determinants of corruption in the judiciary and the consequences of judicial organization for corruption at large. Regarding the latter, it is shown that the actual independence of the judiciary as well as that of prosecution agencies is correlated with lower levels of corruption. This is also true for a third indicator that measures the degree to which judges are held accountable for their decisions (“judicial accountability”). Furthermore, independence and accountability function as complements in preventing corruption – judicial accountability without independence appears to be ineffective, whereas judicial or prosecutorial independence alone can even have adverse effects.

Keywords: Corruption, Judiciary, Judicial Independence, Prosecutorial Independence, Judicial Accountability

JEL Classification: K42, P51

Suggested Citation

Voigt, Stefan and Gutmann, Jerg, On the Wrong Side of the Law - Causes and Consequences of a Corrupt Judiciary (February 10, 2013). International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 43, 2015. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2214728 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2214728

Stefan Voigt (Contact Author)

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics ( email )

Johnsallee 35
Hamburg, 20148
Germany
+49-40-428385782 (Phone)
+49-40-428386794 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Jerg Gutmann

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law and Economics ( email )

Johnsallee 35
Hamburg, 20148
Germany

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