Posted: 12 Feb 2013 Last revised: 18 Aug 2017
Date Written: January 7, 2014
Recent years have witnessed an increased interest, by competition agencies, in assessing the competitive effects of partial acquisitions. We propose an empirical structural methodology to examine quantitatively the unilateral impact of partial horizontal acquisitions. The acquisitions may be direct or indirect, and may or may not correspond to control. The proposed methodology simulates the effects on prices, market shares, firm profits and consumer welfare. It can deal with differentiated product industries and nest full mergers as a special case. We provide an empirical application to several acquisitions in the wet shaving industry.
Keywords: Antitrust, Unilateral Effects, Partial Acquisitions, Oligopoly, Differentiated Products, Demand Estimation
JEL Classification: D12, C54, L13, L41, L66
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Brito, Duarte and Ribeiro, Ricardo and Vasconcelos, Helder, Measuring Unilateral Effects in Partial Horizontal Acquisitions (January 7, 2014). International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 33, 2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2214908 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2214908