What Determines State Capture in Poland?

Wharton Financial Institutions Center Working Paper 13-07

33 Pages Posted: 12 Feb 2013

See all articles by Stanislaw Alwasiak

Stanislaw Alwasiak

Cracow University of Economics

Monika Lewandowska-Kalina

Warsaw School of Economics (SGH)

Lech Kalina

Warsaw School of Economics (SGH)

Oskar Kowalewski

IESEG School of Management; LEM - CNRS 9221

Michał Możdżeń

Cracow University of Economics

Krzysztof Rybinski

Vistula University

Date Written: February 11, 2013

Abstract

In this paper we examine the determinants of ex-ante state capture analyzing all the legal acts that have been passed in the period 1990-2011 in Poland. We find that during this the majority of legal acts were passed with the aim to satisfy the interest of particular groups. Furthermore, the regression analysis shows that the likelihood of state capture increases during the period of economic growth and local elections. The likelihood of state capture, however, declines during presidential elections. The results we attribute to different interests of political parties in the period of local and presidential election. Finally, we find that the state capture increased over the years in Poland. Additionally, we show that the EU accession did not prevent state capture in Poland. In contrast, the financial crisis of 2007 resulted in a wake-up effect and the likelihood of state capture declined in Poland.

Keywords: law, corruption, state capture, public interest, transition country, Poland

JEL Classification: H11, H30, H50, K42, P31, P37

Suggested Citation

Alwasiak, Stanislaw and Lewandowska-Kalina, Monika and Kalina, Lech and Kowalewski, Oskar and Możdżeń, Michał and Rybinski, Krzysztof, What Determines State Capture in Poland? (February 11, 2013). Wharton Financial Institutions Center Working Paper 13-07, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2215218 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2215218

Stanislaw Alwasiak

Cracow University of Economics

ul. Rakowicka 27
Krakow, 31-510
Poland

Monika Lewandowska-Kalina

Warsaw School of Economics (SGH) ( email )

aleja Niepodleglosci 162
PL-Warsaw, 02-554
Poland

Lech Kalina

Warsaw School of Economics (SGH) ( email )

aleja Niepodleglosci 162
PL-Warsaw, 02-554
Poland

Oskar Kowalewski (Contact Author)

IESEG School of Management ( email )

1 Parvis de La Défense
Socle de la Grande Arche
Paris La Défense cedex, 92044
France

HOME PAGE: http://www.ieseg.fr/en/faculty-and-research/professor/?id=1740

LEM - CNRS 9221 ( email )

Lille
France

HOME PAGE: http://lem.cnrs.fr/

Michał Możdżeń

Cracow University of Economics ( email )

ul. Rakowicka 27
Krakow, 31-510
Poland

Krzysztof Rybinski

Vistula University ( email )

Stoklosy 3
Warsaw
Poland

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