Defying Conventional Wisdom: The Case for Private Antitrust Enforcement

83 Pages Posted: 14 Feb 2013 Last revised: 23 Nov 2013

Joshua P. Davis

University of San Francisco - School of Law

Robert H. Lande

University of Baltimore - School of Law

Date Written: February 1, 2013

Abstract

The conventional wisdom is that private antitrust enforcement lacks any value. Indeed, skepticism of private enforcement has been so great that its critics make contradictory claims. The first major line of criticism is that private enforcement achieves too little — it does not even minimally compensate the actual victims of antitrust violations and does not significantly deter those violations. A second line of criticism contends that private enforcement achieves too much — providing excessive compensation, often to the wrong parties, and producing overdeterrence. This article undertakes the first ever systematic evaluation of these claims. Building upon original empirical work and theoretical inquiry by the authors, and an assessment of the specific factual bases of the criticisms, the article demonstrates that private enforcement provides important and beneficial compensation and deterrence, although the level of both is likely suboptimal. Moreover, the article shows it is highly unlikely that private enforcement produces excessive compensation or deterrence. The article concludes that private enforcement should be strengthened and explores some implications of this conclusion.

Keywords: antitrust, private antitrust enforcement, empirical research, class action, antitrust damages

Suggested Citation

Davis, Joshua P. and Lande, Robert H., Defying Conventional Wisdom: The Case for Private Antitrust Enforcement (February 1, 2013). 48 Georgia Law Review 1 (2013); Univ. of San Francisco Law Research Paper No. 2013-08. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2217051

Josh Paul Davis (Contact Author)

University of San Francisco - School of Law ( email )

2130 Fulton Street
San Francisco, CA 94117
United States

Robert H. Lande

University of Baltimore - School of Law ( email )

1420 N. Charles Street
Baltimore, MD 21218
United States

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