Information and Quality When Motivation is Intrinsic: Evidence from Surgeon Report Cards

51 Pages Posted: 17 Feb 2013 Last revised: 19 May 2024

See all articles by Jonathan T. Kolstad

Jonathan T. Kolstad

University of Pennsylvania - Health Care Systems Department

Date Written: February 2013

Abstract

If profit maximization is the objective of a firm, new information about quality should affect firm behavior only through its effects on market demand. I consider an alternate model in which suppliers are motivated by a desire to perform well in addition to profit. The introduction of quality "report cards" for cardiac surgery in Pennsylvania provides an empirical setting to isolate the relative role of extrinsic and intrinsic incentives in determining surgeon response. Information on performance that was new to surgeons and unrelated to patient demand led to an intrinsic response four times larger than surgeon response to profit incentives.

Suggested Citation

Kolstad, Jonathan T., Information and Quality When Motivation is Intrinsic: Evidence from Surgeon Report Cards (February 2013). NBER Working Paper No. w18804, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2219802

Jonathan T. Kolstad (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Health Care Systems Department ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Colonial Penn Center
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6358
United States

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