Using Provider Performance Incentives to Increase HIV Testing and Counseling Services in Rwanda

24 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016

See all articles by Damien de Walque

Damien de Walque

World Bank; World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Paul J. Gertler

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Sergio Bautista-Arredondo

Government of Mexico - National Institute of Public Health

Ada Kwan

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Christel Vermeersch

World Bank

Jean de Dieu Bizimana

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Agnes Binagwaho

Ministry of Health of Rwanda - Harvard Medical School - Darmouth College, Geisel School of Medicine

Jeanine Condo

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: February 1, 2013

Abstract

Paying for performance provides financial rewards to medical care providers for improvements in performance measured by specific utilization and quality of care indicators. In 2006, Rwanda began a paying for performance scheme to improve health services delivery, including HIV/AIDS services. This study examines the scheme's impact on individual and couples HIV testing and counseling and using data from a prospective quasi-experimental design. The study finds a positive impact of paying for performance with an increase of 6.1 percentage points in the probability of individuals having ever been tested. This positive impact is stronger for married individuals: 10.2 percentage points. The results also indicate larger impacts of paying for performance on the likelihood that the respondent reports both partners have ever been tested, especially among discordant couples (14.7 percentage point increase) in which only one of the partners is HIV positive.

Keywords: Health Monitoring & Evaluation, Disease Control & Prevention, Population Policies, Health Systems Development & Reform, HIV AIDS

Suggested Citation

de Walque, Damien and Gertler, Paul J. and Bautista-Arredondo, Sergio and Kwan, Ada and Vermeersch, Christel and de Dieu Bizimana, Jean and Binagwaho, Agnes and Condo, Jeanine, Using Provider Performance Incentives to Increase HIV Testing and Counseling Services in Rwanda (February 1, 2013). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6364. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2221157

Damien De Walque (Contact Author)

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States

HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/ddewalque

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Paul J. Gertler

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )

545 Student Services Building, #1900
2220 Piedmont Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-1418 (Phone)
510-642-4700 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Sergio Bautista-Arredondo

Government of Mexico - National Institute of Public Health ( email )

Universidad 655
Santa María Ahuacatitlán
Cuernavaca Morelos
Mexico

Ada Kwan

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Christel Vermeersch

World Bank ( email )

Jean De Dieu Bizimana

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Agnes Binagwaho

Ministry of Health of Rwanda - Harvard Medical School - Darmouth College, Geisel School of Medicine

Kigali
Rwanda

Jeanine Condo

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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