Institutional Changes of Specified Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs)

The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, doi.org/10.1016/j.najef.2014.03.002

41 Pages Posted: 21 Feb 2013 Last revised: 8 Feb 2015

See all articles by Milan Lakicevic

Milan Lakicevic

College of Economics

Yochanan Shachmurove

City University of New York, CUNY City College of New York - Department of Economics; The University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Milos Vulanovic

EDHEC Business School

Date Written: February 1, 2013

Abstract

This study documents the changes in the corporate design of modern Specified Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) for the years 2003 to 2012. Do institutional characteristics of SPACs determine the success of their merger outcomes? The paper finds that SPACs significantly redesigned their structure in the period under observation. In addition, the probability of a merger for SPACs increases if they are able to announce the deal soon after the Initial Public Offering (IPO), if the deal focuses on China and when their IPO is underwritten by EarlyBirdCapital.

Keywords: Specified Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs), Blank Checks, M&A, IPO, Unit IPO, Warrants, Reverse Mergers, Private Equity

JEL Classification: G12, G14, G24, G30, G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Lakicevic, Milan and Shachmurove, Yochanan and Vulanovic, Milos, Institutional Changes of Specified Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) (February 1, 2013). The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, doi.org/10.1016/j.najef.2014.03.002. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2221349 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2221349

Milan Lakicevic

College of Economics ( email )

Cetinjska br.2
Podgorica, 81 000
Montenegro

Yochanan Shachmurove (Contact Author)

City University of New York, CUNY City College of New York - Department of Economics ( email )

160 Convent Avenue
New York, NY 10031
United States
212-650-6202 (Phone)

The University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-1090 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

Milos Vulanovic

EDHEC Business School ( email )

24, avenue Gustave Delory
CS 50411
Roubaix, 59057
France

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
641
Abstract Views
2,971
rank
39,568
PlumX Metrics