Measuring Unilateral Effects in Partial Acquisitions

48 Pages Posted: 21 Feb 2013

See all articles by Duarte Brito

Duarte Brito

New University of Lisbon

Ricardo Ribeiro

Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Católica Porto Business School

Helder Vasconcelos

Universidade do Porto - Faculdade de Economia (FEP)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2013

Abstract

Recent years have witnessed an increased interest, by competition agencies, in assessing the competitive effects of partial acquisitions. We propose an empirical structural methodology to examine quantitatively the unilateral impact of partial acquisitions involving pure financial interests and/or effective corporate control on prices, market shares,firm profits and consumer welfare. The proposed methodology can deal with differentiated products industries, with both direct and indirect partial ownership interests and nests full mergers (100% financial and control acquisitions) as a special case. We provide an empirical application to several acquisitions in the wet shaving industry.

Keywords: Antitrust, Demand Estimation, Differentiated Products, Oligopoly, Partial Acquisitions, Unilateral Effects

JEL Classification: C54, D12, L13, L41, L66

Suggested Citation

Brito, Duarte and Ribeiro, Ricardo and Vasconcelos, Helder, Measuring Unilateral Effects in Partial Acquisitions (February 2013). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9354. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2221754

Duarte Brito

New University of Lisbon ( email )

1099-085 Lisboa, 1099-085
Portugal

Ricardo Ribeiro

Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Católica Porto Business School ( email )

Rua Diogo Botelho, 1327
Porto, 4169-005
Portugal
+351-22619-6200 (Phone)
+351-22619-6291 (Fax)

Helder Vasconcelos

Universidade do Porto - Faculdade de Economia (FEP) ( email )

Rua Dr. Roberto Frias
s/n
4200-464 Porto, 4200-464
Portugal

HOME PAGE: http://www.fep.up.pt/docentes/hvasconcelos

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