A Simple Model of the Commercial Lobbying Industry

46 Pages Posted: 22 Feb 2013

See all articles by Thomas Groll

Thomas Groll

Columbia University - School of International and Public Affairs; Institute for Corruption Studies

Christopher J. Ellis

University of Oregon - Department of Economics

Date Written: February 21, 2013

Abstract

In this paper we model the commercial lobbying industry (such as the so-called K-Street lobbyists of Washington, D.C.). In contrast to classical special interest groups commercial lobbying firms are not directly motivated by policy outcomes. They exist to make profits by selling intermediaries services between their clients and policymakers. We explain why these firms exist, and their implications for social welfare. We find that in a simple general equilibrium framework the market level of commercial lobbying services is typically socially inefficient, and characterize the nature of the distortions involved.

Keywords: lobbying, influence activities, information acquisition, financial contributions, commercial lobbying firms, political access

JEL Classification: D720, D820

Suggested Citation

Groll, Thomas and Ellis, Christopher J., A Simple Model of the Commercial Lobbying Industry (February 21, 2013). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4110, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2221842

Thomas Groll

Columbia University - School of International and Public Affairs ( email )

420 West 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States
2128510194 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.columbia.edu/~tg2451

Institute for Corruption Studies

Stevenson Hall 425
Normal, IL 61790-4200
United States

Christopher J. Ellis (Contact Author)

University of Oregon - Department of Economics ( email )

Eugene, OR 97403
United States

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