Dynamic Commercial Lobbying

46 Pages Posted: 22 Feb 2013

See all articles by Thomas Groll

Thomas Groll

Columbia University - School of International and Public Affairs; Institute for Corruption Studies

Christopher J. Ellis

University of Oregon - Department of Economics

Date Written: February 21, 2013

Abstract

This study explains the observed repeated personal interactions between lobbyists and policymakers. The analysis uses a dynamic model of commercial lobbying in which citizens may hire lobbyists to present policy proposals on their behalf to policymakers. It is shown that repeated interactions with lobbyists simplify a policymaker’s information problem in the presence of unverifiable information provision and allow a solution to their contracting problem. The welfare implications of these interactions depend on whether the policymakers’ information or contracting problem predominates. Further, the policymaker’s information problem and financial contributions may actually improve social welfare in comparison to the full information outcome.

Keywords: dynamic lobbying, influence activities, information acquisition, financial contributions, commercial lobbying, political access, moral hazard

JEL Classification: D720, D780

Suggested Citation

Groll, Thomas and Ellis, Christopher J., Dynamic Commercial Lobbying (February 21, 2013). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4114, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2221851

Thomas Groll

Columbia University - School of International and Public Affairs ( email )

420 West 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States
2128510194 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.columbia.edu/~tg2451

Institute for Corruption Studies

Stevenson Hall 425
Normal, IL 61790-4200
United States

Christopher J. Ellis (Contact Author)

University of Oregon - Department of Economics ( email )

Eugene, OR 97403
United States

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