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Special Interests after Citizens United: Access, Replacement, and Interest Group Response to Legal Change

Annual Review of Law & Social Science, Forthcoming

NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 13-02

29 Pages Posted: 22 Feb 2013 Last revised: 8 Aug 2013

Samuel Issacharoff

New York University School of Law

Jeremy Peterman

New York University School of Law

Date Written: February 21, 2013

Abstract

The legal literature on campaign finance law and the political science literature on how and why interest groups mobilize use different methodologies to get at overlapping issues. This review integrates some of these insights to better understand the relationship between interest group participation in elections and changes in campaign finance law. The post-Citizens United world of law created some regulatory vacuums that only some groups tried to take advantage of. For example, little corporate money found its way into SuperPACs or groups engaging in independent electoral advocacy. We argue that understanding interest groups’ objectives of using contributions to candidates to obtain access, on the one hand, or using independent expenditures to install friendly candidates in office, on the other, is key to analyzing how interest groups respond to legal developments. We also argue that while interest group participation in elections increased in 2012, the party centric federal election system was largely resilient to increased interest group mobilizations highlighting the difficulties with the replacement-oriented strategy.

Suggested Citation

Issacharoff, Samuel and Peterman, Jeremy, Special Interests after Citizens United: Access, Replacement, and Interest Group Response to Legal Change (February 21, 2013). Annual Review of Law & Social Science, Forthcoming; NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 13-02. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2222063

Samuel Issacharoff (Contact Author)

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-998-6580 (Phone)
212-995-3150 (Fax)

Jeremy Peterman

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States

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