Liquidity and Transparency in Bank Risk Management

42 Pages Posted: 22 Feb 2013

See all articles by Lev Ratnovski

Lev Ratnovski

International Monetary Fund; European Central Bank, Financial Research Division

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2013


Banks may be unable to refinance short-term liabilities in case of solvency concerns. To manage this risk, banks can accumulate a buffer of liquid assets, or strengthen transparency to communicate solvency. While a liquidity buffer provides complete insurance against small shocks, transparency covers also large shocks but imperfectly. Due to leverage, an unregulated bank may choose insufficient liquidity buffers and transparency. The regulatory response is constained: while liquidity buffers can be imposed, transparency is not verifiable. Moreover, liquidity requirements can compromise banks' transparency choices, and increase refinancing risk. To be effective, liquidity requirements should be complemented by measures that increase bank incentives to adopt transparency.

Keywords: Banks, Basel III, Economic models, Liquidity, Risk management, Transparency, liquidity risk, regulation, transparency

JEL Classification: G21, G28, G32

Suggested Citation

Ratnovski, Lev, Liquidity and Transparency in Bank Risk Management (January 2013). IMF Working Paper No. 13/16, Available at SSRN:

Lev Ratnovski (Contact Author)

International Monetary Fund ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States


European Central Bank, Financial Research Division


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