Delegation and Divergent Interests? Global Universities, Global Corporations, and National Strategies

Posted: 22 Feb 2013

See all articles by David M. Hart

David M. Hart

George Mason University - School of Public Policy

Date Written: February 22, 2013

Abstract

Scholars often conceive of international migration as a process centering on a transaction between the state and the individual. However, receiving states is increasingly delegating selection of immigrants, particularly highly-skilled immigrants to third parties, including companies, universities, and NGOs. This delegation leads to the possibility of a divergence between the interests of states and these agents under some conditions, a possibility considered by this presentation.

Suggested Citation

Hart, David M., Delegation and Divergent Interests? Global Universities, Global Corporations, and National Strategies (February 22, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2222717

David M. Hart (Contact Author)

George Mason University - School of Public Policy ( email )

3401 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
703-993-2279 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://mason.gmu.edu/~dhart/

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