A Two-Tiered Demographic System: 'Insiders' and 'Outsiders' in Three Swabian Communities, 1558-1914

67 Pages Posted: 23 Feb 2013

See all articles by Timothy W. Guinnane

Timothy W. Guinnane

Yale University - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Sheilagh Ogilvie

All Souls College, Oxford; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: February 2013

Abstract

This paper presents first results from a project to reconstitute the demographic behavior of three villages in Württemberg (southern Germany) from the mid-sixteenth to the early twentieth century. Using high-quality registers of births, deaths, and marriages, and unusual ancillary sources, we improve on the family-reconstitution techniques pioneered by Louis Henry and applied to good effect by the Cambridge Group and other scholars. This paper focuses on simple, standard demographic measures, in order to provide a broad overview and support comparisons with other places. An extreme system of demographic regulation operated in these Württemberg communities until around 1870. This regulation created a two-tiered demographic system. A group of “insiders” were able to marry, and experienced both high marital fertility and high infant and child mortality. A second group of “outsiders” were prevented from marrying. Many, especially the males, left the community; those who stayed contributed to growing illegitimacy and associated levels of infant and child mortality that were even higher than for the offspring of “insiders”.

Keywords: Fertility, Mortality, Nuptiality, European marriage pattern, institutions, community, politische Ehekonsens, Germany, Württemberg, proto-industry

JEL Classification: N33, J12, J13, K0, O17

Suggested Citation

Guinnane, Timothy W. and Ogilvie, Sheilagh, A Two-Tiered Demographic System: 'Insiders' and 'Outsiders' in Three Swabian Communities, 1558-1914 (February 2013). Yale University Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 1021, Yale Economics Department Working Paper No. 112, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2222932 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2222932

Timothy W. Guinnane (Contact Author)

Yale University - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/timothywguinnanec/

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Sheilagh Ogilvie

All Souls College, Oxford ( email )

All Souls College
Oxford, OX1 4AL
United Kingdom
44-7799-870245 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.asc.ox.ac.uk/person/3498

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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