The Separation of Ownership and Control: An Analysis of Ultimate Ownership in Western European Corporations

55 Pages Posted: 9 May 2000

See all articles by Mara Faccio

Mara Faccio

Purdue University - Krannert School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National University of Singapore (NUS) - Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER)

Larry H.P. Lang

The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - Department of Finance

Date Written: February 2000

Abstract

We analyze the ultimate ownership and control of 3,740 corporations in five Western European countries. We document that families are the most pronounced type of controlling shareholders in Western Europe. In fact, they control 43.9 percent of Western European firms. We also document a significant concentration of wealth within a small number of families. We report that, in Western Europe, pyramids and cross-holdings are used to gain control, and hence a significant separation of ownership from control is achieved but not to the benefit of controlling owners.

JEL Classification: G32

Suggested Citation

Faccio, Mara and Lang, Hsien Ping Larry, The Separation of Ownership and Control: An Analysis of Ultimate Ownership in Western European Corporations (February 2000). EFA 0136. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=222429 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.222429

Mara Faccio (Contact Author)

Purdue University - Krannert School of Management ( email )

1310 Krannert Building
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER) ( email )

BIZ 2 Storey 4, 04-05
1 Business Link
Singapore, 117592
Singapore

Hsien Ping Larry Lang

The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - Department of Finance ( email )

Shatin, N.T.
Hong Kong
+85 2 2609 7761 (Phone)
+85 2 2603 6586 (Fax)

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