Asymmetries in Rent-Seeking

Roger Congleton and Arye Hillman (eds.), Companion to Rent Seeking, Springer, Forthcoming

Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2013-13

Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper Paper No. 2013-03

25 Pages Posted: 27 Feb 2013 Last revised: 28 Jan 2014

See all articles by Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute

Eric Langlais

EconomiX, CNRS & University of Paris Ouest

Bruno Lovat

University of Lorraine - Universite Nancy 2

Francesco Parisi

University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna

Date Written: February 27, 2013

Abstract

In rent-seeking contests, players are seldom identical to one another. In this chapter, we examine the rent-seeking literature that explores the effects of specific forms of asymmetry between contestants. We consider Tullock’s rent-seeking contests involving two players who differ in strength (marginal returns to effort), motivation (valuations of the sought-after rent) and cunning (bargaining power). We study the combined interaction of these three possible forms of asymmetry in rent-seeking. We examine how these asymmetries affect the rent-seeking contest and investigate the effect of ex post trading opportunities on the players’ efforts and probabilities of winning and on the social costs of rent-seeking.

Keywords: rent-seeking games, returns to effort, asymmetric rents, asymmetric strength, tradable rents

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe and Langlais, Eric and Lovat, Bruno and Parisi, Francesco, Asymmetries in Rent-Seeking (February 27, 2013). Roger Congleton and Arye Hillman (eds.), Companion to Rent Seeking, Springer, Forthcoming , Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2013-13, Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper Paper No. 2013-03, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2225841

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam ( email )

Postbus 15654
1001 ND
Amsterdam, Noord-Holland 1001 ND
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

Eric Langlais

EconomiX, CNRS & University of Paris Ouest ( email )

200 Avenue de la République
Nanterre, 92200
France

HOME PAGE: http://economix.u-paris10.fr/fr/membres/?id=889

Bruno Lovat

University of Lorraine - Universite Nancy 2 ( email )

Nancy
France

Francesco Parisi

University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )

229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

University of Bologna ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy

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