Download This PaperAsymmetries in Rent-Seeking
Roger Congleton and Arye Hillman (eds.), Companion to Rent Seeking, Springer, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 73-91, 2015
Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2013-13
Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper Paper No. 2013-03
25 Pages Posted: 27 Feb 2013 Last revised: 27 Jan 2014
Date Written: February 27, 2013
Abstract
In rent-seeking contests, players are seldom identical to one another. In this chapter, we examine the rent-seeking literature that explores the effects of specific forms of asymmetry between contestants. We consider Tullock’s rent-seeking contests involving two players who differ in strength (marginal returns to effort), motivation (valuations of the sought-after rent) and cunning (bargaining power). We study the combined interaction of these three possible forms of asymmetry in rent-seeking. We examine how these asymmetries affect the rent-seeking contest and investigate the effect of ex post trading opportunities on the players’ efforts and probabilities of winning and on the social costs of rent-seeking.
Keywords: rent-seeking games, returns to effort, asymmetric rents, asymmetric strength, tradable rents
JEL Classification: D72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
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Francesco Parisi
University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )
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Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States