On the Comparative Foundations of Principles in International Law: The Move Towards Rules and Transparency in Fiscal Policy as Examples

22 Pages Posted: 5 Mar 2013

See all articles by Matthias Goldmann

Matthias Goldmann

Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law; Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE; Goethe University Frankfurt - Cluster of Excellence Normative Orders; Goethe University Frankfurt

Date Written: March 1, 2013

Abstract

This chapter argues that principles in international law have their basis in comparative and analogical reasoning. It provides a taxonomy of principles ranging from general principles of law to soft legal principles and structural principles which are devoid of normative significance. The classification of principles in international law depends on the extent to which they find confirmation in domestic and/or international law and to which their extrapolation to the international level might be suitable. In this regard, international soft law codifications like the UNCTAD Principles on Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing might corroborate the formation of principles in international law. The chapter analyzes this process by using two examples from the field of fiscal policy: Substantive fiscal policy rules on debt or deficit ceilings; and rules on fiscal transparency. In both respects, the UNCTAD Principles strengthen important trends in domestic fiscal policy and fosters the emergence of an array of principles of varying legal character.

Keywords: principles, general principles of law, soft law, fiscal policy, debt ceiling, budget deficit, fiscal transparency

JEL Classification: F53, G28, H30, H61, H63

Suggested Citation

Goldmann, Matthias, On the Comparative Foundations of Principles in International Law: The Move Towards Rules and Transparency in Fiscal Policy as Examples (March 1, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2226879 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2226879

Matthias Goldmann (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law ( email )

Im Neuenheimer Feld 535
69120 Heidelberg, 69120
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.mpil.de/ww/en/pub/organization/scientific_staff/mgoldman.cfm

Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE

House of Finance
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.safe-frankfurt.de

Goethe University Frankfurt - Cluster of Excellence Normative Orders ( email )

Germany

Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )

Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
HoF H4
Frankfurt, 60629
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.jura.uni-frankfurt.de/62222403/Goldmann

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