The Disability Screening Process and the Labor Market Behavior of Accepted and Rejected Applicants: Evidence from the Health and Retirement Study

Posted: 6 Mar 2013

See all articles by Seth H. Giertz

Seth H. Giertz

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Jeffrey D. Kubik

Syracuse University - Department of Economics

Date Written: 2011

Abstract

This paper uses Social Security earnings records linked to data from the Health and Retirement Study to examine the labor market behavior of rejected and accepted disability applicants prior to their application. We find that rejected applicants have substantially lower earnings and labor force participation rates during the decade prior to application than beneficiaries. Also, we find some evidence of a divergence between these groups, with rejected applicants leaving the labor force at a faster rate than beneficiaries as their application date approaches. One interpretation of these results is that the disability screening process on average separates those who are at least partially motivated by adverse economic circumstances when applying for disability benefits from other applicants.

Suggested Citation

Giertz, Seth H. and Kubik, Jeffrey D., The Disability Screening Process and the Labor Market Behavior of Accepted and Rejected Applicants: Evidence from the Health and Retirement Study (2011). Journal of Labor Research Vol. 32, No. 3. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2228780

Jeffrey D. Kubik

Syracuse University - Department of Economics ( email )

426 Eggers Hall
Syracuse, NY 13244-1020
United States
315-443-9063 (Phone)
315-443-1081 (Fax)

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