The Role of Interjurisdictional Competition in Shaping Canadian Corporate Law

Posted: 31 Aug 2000

See all articles by Jeffrey G. MacIntosh

Jeffrey G. MacIntosh

University of Toronto - Faculty of Law

Douglas J. Cumming

Florida Atlantic University

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Abstract

While competitive corporate law production has been well documented in the United States, there is a comparative dearth of Canadian evidence. This article addresses the question of whether the competitive model of corporate law production has operated, or could operate, in Canada. To this end, both the supply side and the demand side of the Canadian incorporation market are critically examined. The theory and empirical evidence indicate that institutional barriers have limited the extent of competitive corporate law production. The Uniformity Hypothesis, which postulates a legislative maximand of uniformity of provincial laws and not revenues derived from incorporation business, is advanced as a more compelling account of the observed pattern of Canadian corporate law reform. The evidence is consistent with related research indicating that jurisdiction shopping for corporate charters has not always resulted in gains for shareholders of Canadian corporations.

JEL Classification: K00, K22, G38

Suggested Citation

Macintosh, Jeffrey G. and Cumming, Douglas J., The Role of Interjurisdictional Competition in Shaping Canadian Corporate Law. International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 20, No. 2, Pp. 141-186, August 2000. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=222989

Jeffrey G. Macintosh

University of Toronto - Faculty of Law ( email )

78 and 84 Queen's Park
Toronto, Ontario M5S 2C5
Canada
416-978-5795 (Phone)
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Douglas J. Cumming (Contact Author)

Florida Atlantic University ( email )

777 Glades Rd
Boca Raton, FL 33431
United States

HOME PAGE: http://booksite.elsevier.com/9780124095373/

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