Dynamic Sender-Receiver Games

Forthcoming in Journal of Economic Theory

HEC Paris Research Paper No. 966/2013

44 Pages Posted: 9 Mar 2013

See all articles by Jerome Renault

Jerome Renault

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Eilon Solan

Tel Aviv University - School of Mathematical Sciences

Nicolas Vieille

HEC Paris - Economics & Decision Sciences

Date Written: September 15, 2012

Abstract

We consider a dynamic version of sender-receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as players become very patient. Under these assumptions, the limit set depends on the Markov chain only through its invariant measure. The (limit) equilibrium payoffs are the feasible payoffs that satisfy an individual rationality condition for the receiver, and an incentive compatibility condition for the sender.

Keywords: sender-receiver, dynamic games, bayesian games, communication, repeated games

JEL Classification: C73, D83

Suggested Citation

Renault, Jerome and Solan, Eilon and Vieille, Nicolas, Dynamic Sender-Receiver Games (September 15, 2012). Forthcoming in Journal of Economic Theory, HEC Paris Research Paper No. 966/2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2229960 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2229960

Jerome Renault

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) ( email )

Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France

Eilon Solan

Tel Aviv University - School of Mathematical Sciences ( email )

Tel Aviv 69978
Israel

Nicolas Vieille (Contact Author)

HEC Paris - Economics & Decision Sciences ( email )

Paris
France

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