Policing the Firm

64 Pages Posted: 9 Mar 2013 Last revised: 23 Sep 2015

D. Daniel Sokol

University of Florida - Levin College of Law; George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center

Date Written: March 7, 2013

Abstract

Criminal price fixing cartels are a serious problem for consumers. Cartels are hard to both find and punish. Research into other kinds of corporate wrongdoing suggests that enforcers should pay increased attention to incentives within the firm to deter wrong-doing. Thus far, antitrust scholarship and policy have ignored this insight. This article suggests how to improve antitrust enforcement by focusing its efforts on changing the incentives of internal firm compliance.

Keywords: price fixing, corporate wrongdoing, antitrust enforcement, cartels, compliance, leniency, price fixing, corporate crime, FCPA

JEL Classification: K21, L41, M14

Suggested Citation

Sokol, D. Daniel, Policing the Firm (March 7, 2013). Notre Dame Law Review, 82(2):785-848; Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-13. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2230121

D. Daniel Sokol (Contact Author)

University of Florida - Levin College of Law ( email )

Spessard L. Holland Law Center
P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States
(352) 273-0968 (Phone)
(352) 392-3005 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.ufl.edu/faculty/d-daniel-sokol

George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center ( email )

200 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20052
United States

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