Policing the Firm

64 Pages Posted: 9 Mar 2013 Last revised: 23 Sep 2015

See all articles by D. Daniel Sokol

D. Daniel Sokol

USC Gould School of Law; USC Marshall School of Business

Date Written: March 7, 2013

Abstract

Criminal price fixing cartels are a serious problem for consumers. Cartels are hard to both find and punish. Research into other kinds of corporate wrongdoing suggests that enforcers should pay increased attention to incentives within the firm to deter wrong-doing. Thus far, antitrust scholarship and policy have ignored this insight. This article suggests how to improve antitrust enforcement by focusing its efforts on changing the incentives of internal firm compliance.

Keywords: price fixing, corporate wrongdoing, antitrust enforcement, cartels, compliance, leniency, price fixing, corporate crime, FCPA

JEL Classification: K21, L41, M14

Suggested Citation

Sokol, D. Daniel, Policing the Firm (March 7, 2013). Notre Dame Law Review, 82(2):785-848, Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-13, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2230121

D. Daniel Sokol (Contact Author)

USC Gould School of Law ( email )

699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

USC Marshall School of Business ( email )

701 Exposition Blvd
Los Angeles, CA California 90089
United States

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